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Abstract 
System stakeholders fail to engage with security until comparatively late in the design and 
development process.  User Experience artefacts like personas and scenarios create this 
engagement, but creating and contextualising them is difficult without real-world, empirical 
data; such data cannot be easily elicited from disengaged stakeholders.  This paper presents an 
approach for engaging stakeholders in the elicitation and specification of security requirements 
at a late-stage of a system's design; this approach relies on assumption-based personas and 
scenarios, which are aligned with security and requirements analysis activities.  We 
demonstrate this approach by describing how it was used to elicit security requirements for a 
medical research portal. 
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1. Introduction 
When building systems, it is generally agreed that its stakeholders should be engaged 
in security as early in the design process as possible.  However, all too often, security 
is considered an after-thought, and security requirements are not properly considered 
until comparatively late in a project's lifecycle.   
Engaging the stakeholders is difficult.  The right stakeholders may be heavily in 
demand, and motivated by innovation rather than security.  For example, a software 
developer may be required to dedicate significant time and resources to 
understanding the complexity of a problem domain, leaving themselves little time for 
applying standard security design techniques.  Such stakeholders may also find 
security a distant topic, with media reports on security threats and privacy invasions 
as somehow irrelevant to a system they are trying to build. 
One way of engaging the security unengaged is rely not only on evocation, but also 
people's natural bias towards personified, rather than anonymous, risk (Schneier, 
2012).  Software developers may gloss over stories about the loss or public 
disclosure of patient medical data, but highlighting their contribution towards such 
losses may draw their attention.  User Experience (UX) artefacts can evoke by 
contextualising or personifying these losses, but building them requires real-world 
empirical data; this can only be collected when stakeholders are engaged, thereby 
leading to a `chicken-and-egg' situation.  
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Recent work (Dray, 2014) has highlighted the power of assumptions when engaging 
developers.  Using UX research to challenge assumptions helps developers recognise 
why such issues need to be addressed, and focus their curiosity towards addressing 
them.  To explore the power of challenging such assumptions, this paper presents an 
approach for eliciting and specifying security requirements using assumption-based 
personas, scenarios, and risks to engage system developers to think more about 
security for a medical research portal, particularly how the portal might be misused.  
In Section 2, we briefly describe the related work upon which this approach is based, 
before presenting the approach in Section 3.  We describe a case study where this 
approach was applied in Section 4, before concluding with some implications for 
security design in Section 5. 
2. Related Work 
2.1. Personifying Security Expectations 
The personas technique is a popular UX approach for personifying users to 
understand their goals and needs (Cooper et al, 2007).  Personas are models that 
provide a specification of archetypical user behaviour.  By designing software to 
satisfy the expectations of these personas, software developers need not rely on their 
own assumptions about users, which may be unwarranted.  In recent years, personas 
have also been used to support secure system design interventions.  For example, 
(Faily and Fléchais, 2010) found that personas not only provided empathy about the 
security challenges of hard-to-reach user groups, but were useful for eliciting 
unforeseen user characteristics if stakeholders felt a persona didn't match reality. 
Personas are data-driven, and collecting the empirical data necessary to build them is 
difficult if stakeholders are not engaged enough to provide or facilitate access to such 
data.  Given these difficulties, (Pruitt and Adlin, 2006) proposes the use of 
assumption personas; these are sketches that articulate assumptions about a user 
population.  Once created, assumption personas allow stakeholders to see the value 
of personas, and how assumptions may colour their characteristics. 
2.2. Contextualising Personas in Secure System Design 
Personas build empathy, but their goals and expectations need to be put in context.  
For this reason, personas are often paired with scenarios; these centre around 
activities performed by users, rather than around the users themselves.  For example,  
(Rosson and Carroll, 2002) used scenarios to describe how hypothetical stakeholders 
tackle current practice; these scenarios may be based on empirical data or 
assumptions.  More recently, (Parkin et al, 2010) successfully engaged senior 
managers using low-fidelity prototypes of security management tools, and a 
collection of scenarios illustrating their use. 
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Together, personas and scenarios illustrate security problems, but understanding 
these problems is not enough to specify solutions that address them: we need to carry 
out a more formal security and requirements analysis.  Personas and scenarios 
supplement these analyses by illustrating how risks are realised, and how 
specification decisions are operationalized.  In doing so, the human implications of 
security design decisions in different contexts of use can be better perceived.   
To illustrate how these different approaches can work together, the Integrating 
Requirements and Information Security (IRIS) Framework (Faily and Fléchais, 2010, 
2011) was devised; the framework demonstrates how the elements constituting 
personas, scenarios, requirements, and risks might be aligned, and the application of 
security, usability, and requirements techniques can complement each other. 
3. Approach 
Using personas and scenarios, we have developed an approach for eliciting and 
specifying security requirements that engages stakeholders in security concerns.  
This approach not only captures information about how usability and security 
concerns impact requirements, it also accommodates a lack of end-user access, 
limited access to project stakeholders, and the need to make assumptions about users 
as transparent as possible during design. 
The approach is tool-supported by the open-source Computer Aided Integration of 
Requirements and Information Security (CAIRIS) requirements management tool 
(Faily, 2013).  CAIRIS was developed to support the IRIS Framework; it allows the 
capture of security, usability, and requirements data as the techniques are applied, 
guides the creation of personas, and automatically evaluates risks for different 
contexts of use (Faily and Lyle, 2013; Faily and Fléchais 2010b). 
3.1. Assumption Persona Development 
The first stage of the approach involves specifying the expectations held about a 
system's prospective user-community.  Implicit assumptions in the available 
documentation are identified, and used to form the basis of assumption personas.  
Not only do these assumption personas clarify expectations about end-users, 
subsequent discussion around these confirm a useful scope of analysis for the 
subsequent stage. 
For each role relevant to the scope of analysis, the available documentation is 
reviewed to elicit factoids for each role.  These are used to establish persona 
characteristics and, based on these, assumption persona narratives.  Once the 
assumption personas are developed, these are presented to the project team for 
review.  Any issues raised by the team are used to revise the assumption personas or 
correct any misinterpretations held about the system.  The process for building these 
personas is described in more detail in (Faily and Fléchais, 2010a). 
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3.2. Design Sessions 
This stage entails holding small focus groups with project team members.  Each 
session focuses on the use of scenarios, requirements, or risk analysis.   
A scenario session involves modelling scenarios carried out by the assumption 
personas in their respective contexts.  Like the personas, these scenarios are 
grounded in assumptions identified from project documentation, or from analysis 
undertaken during other design sessions.  Some of these scenarios focus on 
misusability, by illustrating how unintentional misuse of the system might lead to 
security problems.   
A requirements session involves using the KAOS goal-oriented requirements 
engineering approach (van Lamsweerde, 2009) to elicit and specify requirements 
needing to be satisfied in order for the scenarios to be realised.  Requirements are 
modelled as goal trees and, in addition to being refined to sub-goals, goals may 
conflict with obstacles: conditions representing undesired behaviour and preventing 
an associated goal from being achieved (van Lamsweerde and Letier, 2000).  Such 
obstacles may arise from intentional, as well as accidental, obstacles, thereby making 
it possible for them to model threats (van Lamsweerde, 2004). 
Risk analysis sessions involve using AEGIS (Appropriate and Effective Guidance for 
Information Security): a participative design process (Fléchais et al, 2007).  This 
entails the team members jointly modelling the system's assets in different contexts; 
these assets are modelled using UML class diagrams, where classes represent 
different assets.  The assets are evaluated according to values held by the participants 
about them.  Vulnerabilities, threats, and risks affecting these assets are elicited, 
before possible security controls mitigating these risks are selected.  Although one of 
many risk analysis processes, AEGIS's diagrammatic notation is useful for engaging 
stakeholders about security, providing useful discussion about asset values, and 
eventually yielding relevant security requirements (Fléchais, 2005). 
In all sessions, assumption personas are used as an authority for user expectations; 
these are modified if aspects of the analysis challenge their characteristics.   
During the sessions, elicited requirements and security analysis elements are 
specified within CAIRIS, and the resulting models are discussed with the session 
participants.  After the final session, each requirement is examined and assigned a 
responsible role.  Following this, a specification document is generated and sent to 
project team members for their review. 
4. Case Study 
This approach was evaluated by using it to elicit security requirements for a portal 
that facilitated the sharing of medical study data.  The study data consisted of long-
running, longitudinal studies of people sharing some specific characteristic.  By 
providing an accessible interface to such studies, the portal ensured that research data 
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and meta-data could be re-used by researchers, thereby reducing the need for running 
unnecessary and expensive long-term studies.  
Two particular user roles dominated the design of the portal.  The first of these were 
academic researchers; these would use the portal to find datasets of interest.  The 
project sponsors were keen to maximise take-up by the researcher community, and 
initiatives encouraging this would be looked upon kindly.  The second class of users 
were data managers; these were responsible for curating data sets, which would be 
available via the portal.  The perception held by the project team was that data 
managers were portal’s key user community.   
The portal design was dominated by two contexts of use.  The Research context was 
concerned with researchers interacting with the portal as part of their day-to-day 
research.  The Study context was concerned with data managers’ interaction with the 
portal to curate their datasets, and managing requests for accessing them.  
Although empirical data from representative stakeholders would have made an 
invaluable contribution to the usability and security analysis, there was no scope for 
collecting data from research end-users.  Similarly, time constraints meant that data 
managers from the study exemplars would also not be available.  Fortunately, the 
development team agreed to act as user proxies because of the time they had spent 
working with data managers from the exemplar studies, and their domain knowledge 
based on previous, related research.  However, given that the development team had 
little direct experience of the researcher community, it was important that any 
assumptions that were made about both data managers and researchers needed to be 
as transparent as possible. 
Unfortunately, limited access to stakeholders also extended to the development team.  
Despite the project team being small with only 4 developers, it faced several tight 
deadlines; this made opportunities to work with the project team severely limited.  
Consequently, it was essential to be parsimonious with regards to team member 
access, while at the same time ensuring that the intervention had an impact on the 
development of the portal. 
4.1. Assumption Persona Development 
When the study began, only two documents were available for eliciting assumptions: 
a requirements specification for the portal, and a technical annexe to the portal's 
contract signed by all project partners. 
After a review of the documentation, three roles were evident:  researchers, data 
managers, and gateway administrators. Based on these roles, the documentation was 
analysed to elicit assumptions.  Assumptions were elicited about behaviour, which 
could be reasonably assumed if the documentation accurately represented the 
concerns of the particular stakeholder role.  For example, a requirement indicating 
that first-line support to the portal would be provided between the hours of 9 am to 
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5.30pm might reasonably suggest that the authors believe researchers work only 
during commercial office hours. 
Three skeleton assumption personas were created for each of these roles:  Alex (an 
academic researcher), Brian (a data manager), and Colin (an administrator for the 
Data Gateway).  For each persona's characteristic, a narrative was written 
commensurate with it.  For example, based on persona characteristics summarised by 
In no hurry and Looking to apply data-set once discovered, the following narrative 
describing Alex's motivation was written: 
Alex is looking to use a dataset as soon as he discovers it is suitable.  He isn't in a 
particular hurry, so is prepared to wait for his registration to the Data Gateway and 
the respective data set to be approved. 
The results of this initial analysis to date were presented to the project team.  This 
presentation described the scope assumed for the analysis, provided an overview of 
the work carried out, and Alex, Brian, and Colin were presented.  Each persona 
selected particular persona characteristics.  The third characteristic was chosen as the 
most divisive, in order to stimulate lively discussion about the persona.  At the end of 
this session, it was agreed that Colin's activities were not relevant to the scope of 
analysis, and this persona was dropped from the remainder of the intervention. 
Despite the nature of the documentation used, it was possible to elicit a surprising 
amount of data about both the possible activities and attitudes of personas.  
Moreover, many persona characteristics were elicited during the design sessions.  As 
such, the personas evolved throughout the design sessions, concurring with best 
practice in the use of personas, which suggests that personas should be fostered 
throughout a project’s lifecycle (Pruitt and Adlin, 2006). 
Although identifying the basis for characteristics was straightforward, justifying 
them was more difficult.  Prior to their initial validation, many of the characteristics 
were based exclusively on individual pieces of empirical data.  As such, value 
judgements about the source data and context were directly reflected in these 
characteristics.   
Although the initial workshop surfaced a number of these issues, it was usually not 
until the personas were directly written into scenarios in design sessions that certain 
invalid characteristics were identified.  Applying the personas within a specific 
context did, however, help identify missing data about behaviour not identified 
during their creation and initial presentation to the team. 
4.2. Design Sessions 
Four design sessions were held over the course of a month.  The first was a scenario 
session followed, a day later, by a requirements session.  A risk analysis session took 
place the following week, followed by a final risk analysis session the week after. 
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Due to project deadlines, rather than having access to multiple developers per 
session, only a single developer was available.  The same developer was consistently 
used for each session, and was available for email clarification when queries arose 
outside at other times.  In addition to the allocated portal developer, a non-project 
domain expert participated in the second session.  Although this participant was only 
partially knowledgeable in the on-going project, she was aware of the problem 
domain in general. 
The approach taken during each session was more flexible than originally envisaged.  
In practice, multiple techniques were used when the situation deemed it useful.  For 
example, KAOS was used in each of the first sessions when it was felt most 
appropriate.  Similarly, elements of AEGIS were also used in the first two sessions to 
elicit assets, their relationships, and concerns arising from goals and scenarios.  
Switching from the use of one technique to another did not seem to hinder the 
thought processes of participants in the sessions. 
During the sessions, the personas were progressively refined and embellished with 
further characteristics from the documentation as new insights were gleaned. 
The amount of data elicited from the risk analysis sessions was comparatively small.  
This was mainly due to the resolution of many security and usability problems 
during the requirements and scenarios sessions.  Another reason for the small 
number of explicit risks was a tendency by the project team to dismiss security issues 
deemed out of scope.  On more than one occasion, assets identified as in scope, such 
as portal documentation about the use of some functionality, was de-scoped.   This 
issue of passing responsibility for out-of-scope issues was also apparent from the 
threats and vulnerabilities highlighted in both contexts of use. 
The issue of scope deferral was also contextual.   Most of the risk analysis elements 
were elicited from the Research context; these were associated with assets deemed 
out of the project scope.  The few risk analysis elements not concerning the Study 
environment were also marginalised.  For example, of four risks elicited, only one - a 
Man-in-the-Middle attack - concerned the Study environment.  Upon discussing 
resolutions to this, it was agreed that the portal relied on a secure channel between 
some of its components.  Consequently, responsibility for mitigating more general 
Man-in-the-Middle attacks was delegated to the administration team responsible for 
one of these components. 
Although the project team were reluctant to take a defence-in-depth approach to 
tackling security problems, security concerns were eventually identified.  This was 
possible by focusing attention on goal obstruction within the Study environment; 
unlike the Research environment, this environment concerned concepts that were 
within the project scope.  This allowed threats and vulnerabilities to be mitigated at 
the design level when considered in context with other portal requirements.  This was 
especially useful because, besides the generic internet-facing threats and 
vulnerabilities, it was not entirely clear what the threat model facing the portal might 
be. 
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5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we presented an approach where assumptions were used to ground an 
approach for engaging project team members when eliciting and specifying security 
requirements.  The case study example demonstrated that, in lieu of research on a 
target system’s users, assumptions afford the creation of personas that engage 
developers in security while they building a system.  Moreover, these personas can 
be used in design sessions, which elicit or draw attention to security requirements 
without disrupting a project’s on-going development activities.  Based on the lessons 
learned applying this approach, three security design implications can be taken away.   
First, engagement can follow by focusing on the indirect, rather than direct, 
consequences of security.  One of the difficulties in completing this study arose from 
the lack of engagement with the project team.  Although the project team appeared to 
be genuinely interested in the approach and the analysis being carried out, their time 
was too limited to properly integrate this analysis into the day-to-day running of the 
project.  The case study showed that focusing on the impact of non-security design 
decisions is a more effective technique for engaging developers in security issues 
rather than relying on fear of more generic threats, particular when these threats may 
or may not be relevant (or perceived relevant) to the scope of analysis.  
Second, as much as security should be considered at the outset of a project, we may 
need to develop design approaches for treating it at a comparatively late stage.  This 
study reinforced the need for innovative thinking to ensure that important security 
issues were built into the system. This is an important finding as the individual 
techniques used were designed on the basis that they would be used early in the 
design process.  In contrast, not only were they applied at a comparatively late stage; 
they were used in parallel with other design activities. 
Finally, our findings lead us to conclude that when a security design process is 
devised, its techniques should scale to working with less than optimal input data.  
Moreover, the process should attempt to carry out as much analysis as reasonably 
possible carried out without disrupting other project activities. 
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